
November 07 2011 by

Cricket Liu (Infoblox)
Apparently there's a "massive" attack against DNS infrastructure underway in Brazil. Much of the initial reporting refers to the attack as cache poisoning, though Rod Rasmussen correctly points out that it's not "classic cache poisoning": the culprits allegedly worked at a Brazilian ISP and used default passwords to change the DNS settings on customer premises equipment, and modified the configurations of the ISP's recursive name servers to direct customers to bogus sites. ("Classic" cache poisoning attacks, of course, require no such special access to resolver or name server configuration to carry out.)
Besides raising the upsetting specter of collusion by the employees of ISPs, this threat brings us back to DNSSEC's "last mile" problem. While this would seem like a textbook example of the kind of threat DNSSEC should protect against, in fact DNSSEC wouldn't have been much help to most of the ISP's subscribers. Without a secure channel between a stub resolver, like the one on the laptop I'm typing on, and the local recursive name server, there's no foolproof way of determining that your name server has been replaced.
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Posted in DNSSEC | DNS Security |
5 comments

June 03 2011 by

Cricket Liu (Infoblox)
Yesterday, Infoblox hosted the second annual "Inside Baseball"
event, an informal meeting of representatives from companies that work
with DNS to discuss strategic and operational issues. Dyn, Inc., who
dreamed up the event and hosted last year's meeting at their
headquarters in Manchester, New Hampshire, coordinated registration and
proposed a loose agenda.
Attendance was terrific, with representatives from Dyn, ISC, Verisign, Neustar, F5, Secure64, Google, Microsoft, Comcast, Akamai, OpenDNS, Nettica, NoIP, TZO, Cotendo, Cloudflare, CloudFloor, and Cloudfish attending. (Just kidding. There's no Cloudfish. Yet.)
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Posted in DNSSEC | IPv6 |
0 comments

June 01 2011 by

Cricket Liu (Infoblox)
InfoWorld just gave their 2011 Technology Leadership Award to my old friend and frequent collaborator,
Matt. Matt's worked tirelessly on the deployment of DNSSEC in some of
the biggest and most important zones on the Internet, including the root
zone, .com and .net - all of which, I'll note, went off without a
hitch. That doesn't happen by chance. To think that when I met him, he
was fresh out of Northwestern, interviewing for a job at HP.
Congratulations, Matt. It's an honor you richly deserve.
Oh, and dinner's on me!
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Posted in DNSSEC | DNS Security |
0 comments

March 31 2011 by

Cricket Liu (Infoblox)
The com zone's DS record was added to the root zone today, marking an important milestone in the deployment of DNSSEC. com is the largest zone on the Internet by most measures, containing over 90 million delegations. This means that the administrators of the corresponding 90 million subzones can sign their zones, and validating recursive name servers will be able to follow a continuous chain of trust from the root zone's public Key-Signing Key to validate arbitrary data in those zones.
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Posted in DNSSEC | DNS Security |
2 comments

February 15 2011 by

Cricket Liu (Infoblox)
At one time, when my job actually entailed managing name servers and namespace, I was pretty good at troubleshooting DNS problems. Often just a few queries with dig would tell me what was wrong, especially if the issue was a common one. Lame delegation? Easy. Forgotten trailing dot? Piece of cake.
Last week, though, one of our excellent support engineers here at Infoblox asked for help with a DNSSEC validation failure. A customer was trying to look up the A records for atmos.pds.nasa.gov and was getting a SERVFAIL error in reply. I could reproduce the error, which is sometimes half the battle, but couldn’t immediately determine its cause.
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Posted in DNSSEC | DNS Security |
8 comments